



**THE NIGERIAN BOKO HARAM: FROM THE INCEPTION OF TERRORISM TO THE
STAGNATION OF AN ECONOMY**

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Kieran E. UCHEHARA

Hasan Kalyoncu University Faculty of Economic Administrative and Social Sciences- Department of
Political Science and International Relations. kieran.uchevara@hku.edu.tr Sahinbey/Gaziantep/Turkey

ABSTRACT

The continued bombings, killings, kidnappings and the destruction of property by the Boko Haram is great concern to the Nigerian government and the international community. Its activities has severe economic impacts on those states in the northeast of Nigeria. For example, the financial services sector is the most affected; Banks have begun closing down their business outlets due to a decrease in economic activities in the area. Also, employees of these institutions are increasingly demanding that they be posted to less volatile branches. The mass emigration of Nigerian citizens, who are non-indigenes to the northern region and of the major conflict affected cities in the northeast of Nigeria, is a formidable threat posed by the Boko Haram to the Nigerian economy. This paper concludes that the poor economic conditions in Nigeria, in general and northeast, in particular is generated by the Boko Haram.

Keywords: The Boko Haram, Islamic Jihadist, Nigeria, Northeast, Economy

1. INTRODUCTION

The militant Islamist group, commonly known as the Boko Haram, was established in 2002 by one Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri and, within two years, spread to other neighbouring states including Bauchi and Yobe. Initially referred to as the Yusufiyya or the Nigerian Taliban and later as the Boko Haram, rejected all secular authority in Nigeria. Over time, its position hardened until it clashed with the police (Olaide, I A, 2013: 16). The Boko Haram's principal goal is to create a strict Islamic state in the north that, it believes, would address the ills of the society, including corruption and bad governance. The sect's core beliefs are strict adherence to the Quran and the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammed), and their interpretation as sanctioned by Ibn Taymiyyah (the preferred scholar of Mohammed Yusuf, the sect's leader (Ibid.)). Like the majority of Salafi organisations, it is most concerned

about what it means to be a good Muslim, defined by observance of the prescriptions of the faith, notably the categorical distinction between what is licit (halal) and what is forbidden (haram) (International Crisis Group Report, 2013: 11). Abu Qaqa, the group's best known spokesman, explained: "Our objective is to place Nigeria in a difficult position and even destabilise it and replace it with Sharia". He also said that the group's agenda is to "take Nigeria back to the pre-colonial period when the Sharia law was practised" (Ibid.: 61-62).

Mohammed Yusuf, was always political, wanting an Islamic government, but not violent. That changed over time as more radical lieutenants pushed the movement in more confrontational directions. State harassment and perceptions escalated into vicious conflict, and after Yusuf was killed in 2009 in a police custody, all restraint was lifted, and the Islamic Jihadist morphed into the brutal organisation it is today.

This paper is divided into five sections. The first section deals with the organisation and leadership of the Boko Haram. The second section discusses the external links and networks of the sect. The third section covers the turmoils and catastrophes of the group. The fourth section is based on the sect's damages to the economy. The final section is the conclusion and summary of this paper.

2. ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

The Islamic Jihadist grew to prominence under the charismatic Mohammed Yusuf, an inspirational speaker who was not a particularly effective leader and had trouble keeping his unruly lieutenants, particularly Abubakar Shekau, in check. The movement never had firm command and control. It is formally led by an amir ul-aam (commander in chief) with a Shura (council) of trusted kwamandoji (commanders in Hausa) that is its highest decision-making body. The amir ul-aam cannot speak for the group without Shura approval (Ibid.). In major cities and towns where the group has a presence, a local amir is in charge, beside a commander who oversees and coordinates armed operations. Depending on his influence, the commander may be a Shura member. He is assisted by a nabin, (deputy), who is in turn aided by a mu'askar, who passes orders from the commander and the deputy to foot soldiers. Cities and large towns are divided into lajna (sectors) supervised by sub-amirs for operational and administrative purposes.

Yusuf's main lieutenants were Muhammad Lawan (Potiskum, Yobe state), Mamman Nur and Shekau. Lawan parted ways with him in December 2007 after disagreeing over the ideology and Quran interpretation. He issued an audio recording, accusing Yusuf of insincerity, and rejoined Izala. The Boko Haram attacked his home in a failed attempt on his life during its 2009 uprising. (International Crisis Group interview, 2011).

Mamman Nur is a Shuwa Arab born and raised in Maiduguri, Nigeria, by Chadian parents. He befriended Shekau while both were doing higher Islamic studies at the Borno State of Nigeria College of Legal and Islamic Studies (BOCOLIS) (Ibid.). He apparently introduced Shekau to Yusuf Shekau is a Kanuri from Shekau village on the Nigeria border with Niger, Tarmuwa local government, Yobe state (Ibid). In 1990, he moved to the Mafoni area in Maiduguri and studied under a traditional cleric before entering the Bocolis University, Maiduguri (Ibid.). Nur, said to be more knowledgeable, mature and level-headed, was seen as Yusuf's deputy and eventual successor, but Shekau was chosen after Yusuf's death because he was more radical and aggressive (Ibid.).

Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). (2011). Claimed that "The group has grown more ruthless, violent and destructive and less open to dialogue. Perhaps most audacious were its suicide bombings in Abuja of the police headquarters and the United Nations (UN) building in June and August 2011". (SDGT, 2011).

The security forces became more aggressive in turn in September 2012. On 22 September 2012, the Nigerian security forces slapped round-the-clock curfews on three cities in the Northeast, Damaturu, Potiskum, Mubi, and killed 36 suspected militants, including a top sect commander and arrested more than 200 in house-to-house raids (This Day, 2012). Other factions were neutralised following the capture or killing of their leaders (ibid). On 17 September 2012, soldiers shot dead a sect spokesman, alias Abul Qaqa, outside Kano, along with the sect commander in charge of central Kogi and Kaduna states and Abuja. This was a significant blow, a source close to the Islamic Jihadist said, because the two were considered its "think-tank" (International Crisis Group interview, 2013).

On 23 November 2012, the army offered a 290 million naira (\$1.3 million) reward for information leading to the arrest of Shekau and eighteen other leaders and senior figures (The Vanguard, 2013). Shekau has repeatedly ruled out talks with the government, despite claims by some purported group members that talks were ongoing. Members who proposed dialogue were killed on Shekau's orders, silencing other pro-dialogue individuals (International Crisis Group interview, 2013). Links with foreign Islamist groups, such as the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, that have radicalised its leadership is crucial for our understanding of how dangerous the Boko haram is in Nigeria.

3. EXTERNAL LINKS AND NETWORKS

Since 2009 the Islamic Jihadist has grown from being a localised problem to a national and regional threat. “It has opportunistically tapped into Islamic revivalism globally, and, while it has local roots and origins, it is part of a broader, global ideological current” (Terje ØsTeBØ, 2012: 2). In some cases, this includes ties to organisations outside Africa.

History, religion and ethnicity link northern Nigeria to North Africa, the Middle East and the larger Muslim world. Nigerian Muslims, particularly elites, travel frequently to the Middle East and Muslim Asia and are part of the struggle of ideas in which the al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups also participate. The Boko Haram members reportedly have links with a number of radical groups, including al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. In the aftermath of their June 2009 insurrection, 30 members of the Islamic Jihadist were arrested in Adamawa state and returned to Maiduguri, where they reportedly admitted having received training in Afghanistan (International Crisis Group interview, 2013).

Between 2000 and 2002 Osama bin Laden issued two audio messages calling on Nigerian Muslims to wage jihad and establish an Islamic state. His interest dated from his 1992-1996 stay in Sudan, where he reportedly met Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian from Maiduguri studying at the Islamic University in Khartoum who became his disciple and trained in Afghanistan; according to the Boko Haram sources, Bin Laden asked him to organise a cell in Nigeria with a 300 million naira budget (approximately \$3 million in 2000) (Ibid.). Ali returned home in 2002 and began funding religious activities of Salafi groups that were unaware of the plan. Mohammed Yusuf and his group allegedly were the major beneficiaries (Ibid.).

With the 2003-2004 Kanamma uprising, in which Mohammed Ali was a major player, Izala groups distanced themselves from him as too radical (U.S. Institute of Peace (Andrew, 2012: 3). He and three lieutenants were killed in Jaafar Adam’s guest house during a visit to Kano (International Crisis Group interview, 2011). The Boko Haram accused Jaafar Adam of complicity and vowed revenge. It also accused Ali’s point man, Babagana, of being an informant and marked him for assassination. Adam was killed by the Boko Haram gunmen in April 2007, while leading the morning prayers in his mosque in Kano’s Dorayi area (Ibid.).

The Islamic Jihadist’s links with foreign Islamist groups were strengthened following the 2009 military crackdown. Surviving Islamic Jihadist members escaped through Chad and Niger to Somalia, Algeria and, Afghanistan, where they joined other Islamists and received guerrilla training. That is to say, in 2010-2012, the Boko Haram, was trained in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba regions, and acquired IED and suicide attack skills. This included Mohammed Nur, who is accused of masterminding the 26 August 2011 UN building bombing in Abuja that killed 26 people. He fled to Somalia and reportedly joined Al-Shabaab, through which he is alleged to have made contact with the AQIM. He returned to Nigeria a year later (Report, S/2013/413, 2013: 66-67). Another group member, from Yola in Adamawa state, reportedly fled to Afghanistan and received bomb-making training from al-Qaeda (ibid).

Most bombs are relatively crude, made from local materials that are easy and cheap to obtain, but some are increasingly sophisticated and lethal. On 10 October 2013, the joint Task Force (JTF) and the Social Security System (SSS) recovered from a Boko Haram hideout in Kano’s Gunduwawa suburb a cache of weapons and IEDs that was said to include a sophisticated knapsack- packed suicide bomb (Weekly Trust, 12 October 2013).

Links appear to be most significant with the Ansar Dine (“Supporters of the Faith” in Arabic), the AQIM and the MUJAO, an AQIM splinter group (The New York Times, 2013). Many of these groups’ leaders and fighters from Mali, Mauritania and Algeria have engaged in lucrative criminal business with arms traffickers, narcotics smugglers, kidnappers and human trafficking gangs (See Crisis Group Report, 2012). Some fighters were trained and armed by the former Libyan strongman,

Muammar Qadhafi, to destabilise their home governments (Ibid.). His fall opened many arms depots to local militants (Crisis Group Report, 2011: 32-33).

The three Islamist groups have boosted the Boko Haram. In particular the AQIM made its financial resources, military arsenals and training facilities available (Agande, 2013). During his police interrogation, Yusuf reportedly provided information on the flow of weapons to the group from, among others, private sources in Niger, Cameroon and Chad (Okah, 2009). The military believes the group has significant transnational links. On 27 September 2012, Chief of the Army Staff, Lt.-General Azubike Ihejirika, said it was funded and equipped from abroad. He cited, as evidence, the types of weapons and communication equipment it uses, as well as the expertise it displays with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Senior security officers worry about the ungoverned territories along Nigeria's borders with Niger and Chad. Many weapons, including IEDs, recovered from the Boko Haram have reportedly been traced to Libya (Agande, 2013).

A fall-out from the military's crackdown is that it has increased the movement's presence, and presumably radicalisation, in Niger, Chad and Cameroon (International Crisis Group Africa Report, N°216, 2014: 25). Members can easily travel there because of porous borders and shared ethnicity (many are from the dominant regional ethnic group, the Kanuri, as well as other communities that straddle the borders). In July 2009, Nigeria expelled dozens of the Boko Haram members who were citizens of Niger (WikiLeaks, 2009). The group reportedly has developed rear bases in the south of that country, which it considers a safe haven and recruitment area. Niger security services regard the group as a bigger threat to stability than the AQIM. They have reportedly prevented a number of attacks and captured several couriers carrying money and messages between the AQIM, the MUJAO and the Boko Haram (International Crisis Group Africa Report N°208, 2013: 36-45). Though it is unclear which group organised it, a June 2013 attack on a Niamey prison allowed several the Boko Haram members to escape (ibid.: 42). So far, there have been no major attacks in Niger.

Nigeria and Niger have entered into security cooperation agreements, including for joint border patrols (see below). However, Niamey, anxious to avoid aggravating the situation, demonstrates caution toward the Boko Haram by not suppressing the group too vigorously (Agande, 2013).

Elements are also present in N'Djamena and other parts of Chad (International Crisis Group interview, 2013). The question for security analysts there is no longer will the Boko Haram organise a terrorist attack in the country, but when and where. Its involvement in the Joint Multinational Task Force (JMNTF) against the Boko Haram shows that N'djamena takes this threat seriously. The JMNTF was established by Chad, Niger and Nigeria in 1998 to fight transnational crime, especially trans-border small arms smuggling, but its mandate was expanded in 2009 with the emergence of the Boko Haram to include terrorism. In July 2013, Chad's and Niger's foreign ministers agreed to reinforce security forces and intelligence service cooperation (The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, No. 7, 2013: 8). This could be a good reason why Nigeria's close neighbours have gathered strong strength to fight the sect. All the turmoils and catastrophes brought about by the Boko Haram are numerous.

4. THE TURMOILS AND CATASTROPHES

It will be very difficult to list all the turmoils and catastrophes brought about by the Boko Haram since they are too numerous, more so, when the orgy of violence still unabated. However, some of the major ones are presented below. After the 2009 crackdown, the Boko Haram went underground for a year before surfacing with attacks on police, their stations and military barracks to avenge the killings of Mohammed Yusuf and other comrades. The group also carried out jailbreaks to free members and demanded prosecution of Yusuf's killers, release of detained colleagues, restoration of its destroyed mosque and compensation for members killed by troops. Yusuf was part of a meeting between former President Olusegun Obasanjo, when Yusuf's family and the sect members presented these demands as conditions for ceasefire (International Crisis Group analyst interview, 2011). Originally directed mainly at security forces and government officials, the campaign has expanded to include attacks on Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, suspected collaborators, the

United Nations agencies, bars and schools. On 1 February, the sect killed Sheik Adam Albani, along with his wife and son. Among the seven arrested was Yakub Abdullahi, allegedly its Kaduna and Niger states sub-regional commander (International Crisis Group Africa Report N°216, 2014). It has evolved into terrorism, including against students at state (secular) schools and health workers involved in polio vaccination campaigns (Hall, 2013).

The Boko Haram expanded its operations beyond its core areas of Borno and Yobe states. High-profile attacks included the drive-by shooting of a retired deputy inspector-general of police in Kano, the murders of a former head of the Nigerian immigration service and his two bodyguards in Azare, Bauchi, and the killing of a Borno state comptroller of prisons in his home in Potiskum, Yobe. Tactics became more sophisticated, both in response to increased security and in an effort to stir sectarian conflict. The first attacks in 2010 were predominantly shootings, but Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) began to be used in December, especially in the run-up to the 2011 elections. Often a motorcycle team was responsible, with the rear rider the shooter. However, the security forces banned motorcycles in some cities and in others forced the riders to dismount at the checkpoints. After those elections, the movement turned to vehicle-borne IEDs, cars typically packed with several propane cylinders or explosives-filled drums. In August 2011, it attacked the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Abuja with a suicide IED (Control Risks, 2013). The group also spread its campaign in 2011 to churches. That year's deadliest bombing was on Christmas Eve against St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, outside Abuja, in which over 40 worshippers were killed and dozens injured.

The Islamist Jihadist claimed responsibility, and security agencies believe Kabiru Sokoto, a Boko Haram/Ansaru leader, was the mastermind. The intention was to force the state government to stop the arrests of members fleeing Maiduguri to Kano. In November 2011, the sect wrote an open letter to Kano Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, Emir Ado Bayero and other prominent persons, threatening attacks if the arrests did not stop and demanding release of detainees. For several months the state was a major theatre for the groupsect, prompting an extensive military response. Following a sweeping crackdown in September 2012 that resulted in arrests and killings of prominent members, including Abubakar Adam Kamar, Abul Qaqa, Mohammed Suleiman and Malam Ghali, scores of top the Islamist Jihadist commanders fled, supposedly to Mali and Somalia. Some reportedly were arrested by Niger security operatives in the border town of Kwanni, handed over to Nigerian authorities and taken to Abuja. They have not been heard of since (Onuoha, 2013). The Boko Haram was arguably at its apex in early 2013, when it took control of large swathes of northern Borno state. The subsequent military build-up of the Joint Task Force (CJTF), the military offensive and the use of vigilante groups have hurt the movement. Tactics, however, continue to evolve rapidly, and partially in response to losses and a turn in public opinion, it increasingly relies on attacks on secular schools (first at night, later when students were in classes), villages and CJTF groups.

With its rank and file decimated, the Boko Haram reportedly has resorted to forced conscription and recruiting of criminals and thugs (area boys), paying them for attacks, sometimes with a share of the spoils. In June 2013, male Bama residents began to flee the town 60km from Maiduguri following forced conscription by Boko Haram, which threatened to behead whomever refused to join. On 15 November 2012, the Kano state police declared two notorious gangsters wanted who had been involved in a major armed robbery at the main bureau de change two days earlier (This Day, 2011). In 2011, more than 30 bank robberies were attributed to the Boko Haram. "The Boko Haram, armed robbers attack 100 bank branches," (Ibid.). A month later, troops shot dead a major hashish dealer, known as Dan-Madina, in Damagun, Northeastern Yobe, for alleged involvement in the Boko Haram attacks (International Crisis Group analyst telephone interview, 2012). The movement has also resorted to kidnapping, allegedly for ransom payments, including in neighbouring Cameroon. The latest abduction was of French priest, Georges Vandenbeusch, on 13 November 2013 in Nguetchewé parish of Mayo-Moskota. He was freed on 31 December, after the Boko Haram obtained payment of a ransom and the release of an important member imprisoned in Maroua, Cameroon (Ibid.). Formally

the negotiations were led by senior government officials close to Cameroon President Biya, but the real negotiator was reportedly a wealthy businessman from Cameroon's far north.

The orgy of violence against Christians in the north continued in 2013 in Kogi state, when the Boko Haram raided a church and killed worshippers. The situation alarmed the Christian Elders Forum of Northern States (NOSCEF), which compelled them to raise their voices against the atrocities of the Islamist Jihadist. To prove the Boko Haram really means "western education is evil", since March 2012, the insurgents have set on fire over 12 primary and secondary schools in the three most affected states in the north. In September 2013, the group attacked students' dormitories in Momudo village, Yobe state, and killed 39 students.

Although the Boko Haram has been pushed into the bush, it can still carry out spectacular attacks (International Crisis Group interview, 2013). The insurgents moved to the Sambisa forest and villages in the mountains around Gwoza on the Cameroon border (Ibid.). On 2 December 2013 around 200 insurgents dressed in military uniform and armed with rocket launchers, explosives and assault rifles infiltrated Maiduguri and conducted coordinated attacks on the air force base and a military barracks. Most of the buildings were reportedly destroyed, as well as five aircraft. They also looted and burned shops and homes (The Daily Trust, 2013; Agence France-Presse, 2013). On 20 December 2013, several hundred fighters stormed military barracks outside Bama, close to the Cameroon border, in a predawn raid, torching the compound and killing many soldiers, their wives and children (The Daily Trust, 2013). The army said the Islamists tried to escape across the border, but fighter jets killed many of them, as well as civilians (Ibid.; Agence France-Presse, 2013).

In February 2014, 59 children of the Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, Yobe State were killed (Ibid.). In April 2014, the Boko Haram Islamic sect, carried out the worst dastardly act of terrorism when they abducted 276 female students at government girls' secondary school, in Chibok, Borno State. As the search for the Chibok girls continues, attacks have occurred in several places in Abuja and elsewhere in the North. The offensive embarked upon by the combined troops from Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria has resulted in the killings of many of the insurgents.

Intelligence reports claim that the sect recruits fighters mainly from the neighbouring countries, such as Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic. Apart from this, the porous borders are not helping matters as they facilitate the escape of insurgents after carrying out attacks (Ibid.).

The cycle of violence being unleashed on Nigerians by this group has heightened serious fears among the citizens, including the international community (Okpanga A., Ugwu, S.C. and Eme, O.I., 2012: 10). The dangerous dimension the insecurity challenge has brought about, has become a source of worry since there is belief in some quarters in Nigeria that the trend has even gone beyond religious or political colouration. And has led to the bombing of everything within the sect's reach, regardless of nature and cause. The dangerous dimension the insecurity challenge has brought about, has become a source of worry since there is belief in Nigeria that the trend has even gone beyond religious or political colouration. The economic consequences of the sect are disastrous not only to the economy of the northeast of Nigeria and their people but has also to the entire country.

5. DAMAGES TO THE ECONOMY

Mohammed. (2012). The activities of the sect have seriously affected the economy of the northeast of Nigeria. For instance, commercial and investment banks have been forced to review their operational hours to begin from 9.00a.m. to 12.00 noon and against the normal working hours of 8.00a.m. to 4.00 pm. According to Mohammed, this is a part of the efforts by these financial institutions to safeguard their business interests. Under this new operational arrangement customers, traders in particular, find it very difficult to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks due to this impediment (Mohammed, 2012).

Alternatively, these helpless traders have to hide their money in their shops. That is why, in addition to the frequent suicide bombings, there are rising cases of shop-breakings and burglaries in the affected areas. The growing insecurity in the northeast has seriously affected the socioeconomic

conditions, such that many people including businessmen are fleeing to more peaceful environments in the southern parts of the country. More so, the prices of foodstuffs, have started increasing astronomically following the drastic fall in the transportation of the foodstuffs from north to south where they are consumed at most. This is because farmers in the southeast find it unsafe to travel to the northeast. Consequently, these farm products are stockpiled and wasted in the hands of the farmers who rely on them as the only source of livelihood.

The Boko Haram insurgency has adversely affected the economy of the north and, by extension, Nigeria generally. Every sector of the economy has been disrupted in one way or the other by the sect's continued violence and insecurity in the country, throwing the economy into recession. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW), Nigeria lost more than 935 of its human capital between 2009 and 2012. The World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that the domestic economy lost billions of dollars in Foreign Directs Investment (FDI) as a result of the activities of the Boko Haram (Okereocha, 2012: 46–47). The Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) 2010 Annual Report showed that the total foreign capital inflow into the Nigerian economy stood at \$5.99 billion. The FDI represented about 78.1% drop from \$3.31billion in 2009 (Eme, 2012: 77-99).

Indeed, the unrest posed by the Boko Haram insurgency has crippled the economy of northern Nigeria in particular. As non-indigenes move out of the north, their economic contributions are withdrawn with attendant economic downturn. As this drain is crippling the economy in the north, it has revibrating effects on the nation's macroeconomy. This is because, apart from the schools, churches, parks and government agencies, the sect also attacks commercial places like markets, and banks (Okereocha, 2012: 46–47).

To further buttress the point above, about half of the 10,000 shops and stalls in the markets in Mauduguri have been deserted by the traders who fled the city. In the same vein, about 35% of the over three million Igbos from the southeast of the country who were engaged in both small- and medium-scale business have abandoned their businesses for other places as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency.

The activities of the Boko Haram have affected both local and foreign investments not only in the Northeast, but also Nigeria generally and threatened the transformation agenda of the federal government tremendously. The situation is compelling prospective investors to turn to more stable economies to invest their money. When prospective investors hear news of violence and insecurity, they change their plans because issues of security is paramount to international investors. While this is happening, some industries operating in the Northeast are relocating since the region is not safe for industrial activities.

The worst effect of the sect insurrection is experienced in the agricultural sector. Food items like yam, beans, tomatoes among others are produced in the North and consumed in most cities in the South. Though since the Boko Haram menace started, the prices of the affected agricultural produce coming from the North have hiked due to scarcity. This is because farmers can no longer go to their farms since they have become havens and battle fields for terrorists.

It is an issue of concern to government, individuals and groups that the group activities has expanded from its original conception-that interaction with Western world is forbidden-to that of terrorism in which the group has resolved to continue unwholesome destruction of lives, and properties as well as innocent citizens of Nigeria state. No wonder Olaide (2014) cited in Onuoha (2014) and Bartolotta (2011), when discussing the ideology of the group asserted that the Boko Haram was founded as a local Salafi movement and turned into a Jihad Group which proposes that interaction with the Western World is forbidden and also supports opposition to the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014: 158; Bartolotta, 2011: 9). However, there had been a number of recorded incidences ranging from loss of lives to destruction of properties of people in Nigeria, thus attesting to the fact that the role of the Boko Haram sect has moved from the confines of its principles and practices to that of terrorism and abuse of constitutional privileges and rights of freedom of

association among others. Instances are bound, but there was the incident in Baga town on January 3rd 2015. According to Ikechukwu, and Ugochukwu (2015) and Aljazeera news (2015), that onslaught against Baga Town by the Boko Haram, was feared to have killed hundreds, if not more, and destroyed thousands of homes (Ikechukwu, and Ugochukwu, 2015; Aljazeera News, 2015). This appears to be very horrendous in a developing economy, where human and material resources are needed for optimum socio-economic growth.

These horrible activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria have contributed to inflict significant consequential damages to the economy. By the same token Olaide (2013), in his text about the economic effects of the Boko Haram activities, states that the economic effects of militant insurgency in Nigeria simply connotes consequential effects on the people and government's life which, according to him, can be viewed from two different perspectives: the effects on the state, and those on the individual members of the state, particularly residents of Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and neighbouring states (Olaide, 2013: 18). The militants are not limited to the Boko Haram group alone, but by their nature they are determined to cripple the economic activities of any place they spread their tentacles as well as lead to migration of people from the affected areas due to restiveness. According to Olaide, it must be noted that the Boko Haram has not only led to closure and/or abandonment of peoples' business activities within the affected regions, but also led to migration of people from these areas as well as the reduction of peoples patronage of products from the North because of rumours, such as that members of the Boko Haram are planning to send poisonous products to other parts of Nigeria. This suggests why Olaide (2013), quoting Umar Ibrahim Yakubu, opined thus: in respect of the Boko Haram, we discovered 97% of businesses were negatively affected by the security problem (ibid). Some of them have had to close down, retrench their workers and others had to cut down in the number of hours of operation. Some of these activities conducted by the Boko Haram has destabilised, dehumanised, destroyed and crippled the road networks for successful optimum economic growth in a complicated economy such as Nigeria's economy.

6. CONCLUSION

Apart from the widespread loss of property and innocent lives life being witnessed in the northern part of Nigeria, the activities of the Boko Haram have continued to bring about severe economic downturn consequences in the nation's economy. The state of insecurity created by the Boko Haram is slowly wiping out key industries in a country that stands to lose a lot because these industries are the vital sources of key foreign exchange, of employment for people, and entrepreneurs, and of major tax revenue for the government. Apart from this, the mass emigration of citizens who are non-indigens to the northern region of Nigeria, has a negative impact on the profitability of business in that region itself. Banks are closing down due to a decline in economic activities, while at the local level, business between various states has also been crippled. Residents of the southern states are afraid to visit the northern area, and vice versa. The mass withdrawal of people from the north implies that economic affairs in the area are completely stagnated. The reasons for which the Boko Haram has been operating with relative success, can be attributed to a combination of factors including porous borders, and support from external forces, particularly the Boko Haram linkages and collaborations with the jihadists in the Sahel region. This paper argues that the alignment of the terror groups in the Sahel region, makes more urgent the need to quickly integrate the continent's security apparatus. Equally important is the need for African states to strengthen their governance institutions and; support the regional and continentwide security partnership initiatives undertaken by the African Union (AU), the regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and strengthen counter-insurgency capacity, alongside the governance institutions of individual countries. These states should also scale up their intelligence and counter-terrorism linkages with African countries.

REFERENCES

Agande, Ben. (2013). "Boko Haram leader Shekau shot, escapes to Mali". The Vanguard. www.vanguardngr.com Headlines (accessed 19 January 2013).

Ajazeera News. (2015). The Boko Haram kill (100) one hundred people at Bega town to set Islamic state in North Eastern Nigeria". <http://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/5.Ugochukwu%20U.%20Ikeije-1.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2015).

Andrew, Walker. (2012). "What is Boko Haram?". U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), 3.

Bartolotta, C. (2011). "Terrorism in Nigeria: The rise of Boko Haram". *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 9.

"Boko Haram chief killed in Adamawa, 156 arrested". (2012). This Day Live. www.book.xlibx.info/.../3475778-7-international-crisis-gro... (accessed 25 September 2012).

"Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency". (2014). International Crisis Group Africa Report, N°216: 25. [tpps://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi](https://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi). (accessed 21 May 2014).

Eme, O.I, et al. 2012. "Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria". *AJBMR*, 1 (9): 77-99.

Hall, John. (2013). "Nigeria massacre: Boko Haram Islamists kill 42 at boarding school in Yobe state". *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-massacre-boko-haram-islamists-kill-42-at-boarding-school-in-yobe-state-8695355.html> (accessed 8 July 2013).

Ikechukwu, Dialoke1 and Ugochukwu, .U. Ikeije. (2015). Why we attacked Baga–Boko Haram. <http://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/5.Ugochukwu%20U.%20Ikeije-1.pdf> (accessed 29 January 2015).

In 2011, more than 30 bank robberies were attributed to the Boko Haram, "The Boko Haram armed robbers attack 100 bank branches". This Day. www.thepeoplehistory.com/december10th.html (accessed 10 December 2011).

In May 2013, a senior Nigerian military official said "the Boko Haram fighters were "very, very wellarmed with weapons from Libya". "Nigerian military in heavy fighting with the Boko Haram militants". *The Guardian*, London. [tpps://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi](https://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi). (accessed 21 May 2013).

International Crisis Group Africa Report N°208, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? (2013): 36-45.

Mohammed, M. (2012). Violence and Threat to Yobe's Economic Growth, *The Moment*. <https://www.omicsonline.com/.../the-socioeconomic-implica> (accessed 7 March 2012).

"New threat in Nigeria as militants split off". (23 April 2013). *The New York Times*. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/.../boko-haram-and-the-kidnappi...> (accessed 29 May 2014).

"Niger: 2009 Country Report on Terrorism". (2008). U.S. Embassy Niamey Cable. *WikiLeaks*. <http://www.book.xlibx.info/bo-political/3475778-8-international-crisis-group-headquarters-avenue-louise-149-1050-br.php>. (accessed 16 December 2008).

Nigeria: Suicide bombers now package IEDs in school bags. (2013). *Weekly Trust*. allafrica.com/stories/201310120190.html-(accessed 12 October 2013).

Okah, Henry. (2009). "The Boko Haram declares war". *Africa Confidential*. http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3054/Henry_Okah (accessed 24 June 2009).

Okereocha, C. (2012). Heartache for the Economy, *TELL*. (14 May 2012): 46–47.

Okpanga A., Ugwu, S.C. and Eme, O.I. (2012). "Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria". *Arabain Journal of Business and Management Review*, 1 (9), 10.

Olaide, I A. (2013). "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its implication and the way forwards towards avoidance of future insurgency". *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 3 (11), 16.

Onuoha, Freedom. (2014). *The Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria*. In de montclos, perouse (ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the state in Nigeria*. Leiden: Africa Studies Centre, 158.

Onuoha, Freedom. (2013). "The Cost of Boko Haram Attacks on Critical Telecommunication Infrastructure in Nigeria". *e-International Relations*. www.e-ir.info (accessed 3 November 2013).

"Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060". (2013). S/2013/413: 66-67.

Special Report: Boko Haram. Control Risks. (February 2013).

Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). (2011). Citing the latter case and the Madalla Church 2011 Christmas attack, the U.S. named Shekau and two lieutenants—Abubakar Adam Kamar and Khalid al-Barnawi—as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists". (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224.

Terje, ØsTeBØ. (2012). "Islamic militancy in Africa". *Africa Security Brief*, 23 (11), 2.

"The Boko Haram launches major urban attack against Nigerian military". *Agence France-Presse*. <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=239720...>(accessed 2 December 2013).

The International Crisis Group analyst interview, Yusuf's brother-in-law Babakura Fugu. (2011). He was part of a meeting between former President Olusegun Obasanjo, Yusuf's family and sect members when they presented these demands as conditions for ceasefire.

The International Crisis Group Report. (2013). "Understanding Islamism" The "pious ancestors"—al-Salaf al-Salih—are invoked mainly as exemplars of the good Muslim, but also as validators of conservative readings of scripture".

The International Crisis Group Roundtable. (2012). "The Boko Haram's renewed insurgency from summer 2011, has been traced to the return of over 60 militants trained in Libya". *National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria*. www.ndc.gov.ng/index.php/.../80-ndc-legacy-information. (accessed 8 February 2012).

The Middle East/North Africa Report N°115. (2011). "Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges After Qadhafi". old.crisisgroup.org/.../middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/1. (accessed 14 December 2011): 32-33.

They also looted and burned shops and homes, "5 aircraft destroyed in Maiduguri attack". *Daily Trust*. https://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi..(accessed 3 December 2013).

"Under attack? Niger faced with religious extremism and terrorism". *The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, N°7*. Institute for Security Studies. (2013): 8.